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Abstract
It is often argued that the observed trend towards early retirement is due mainly to the implicit tax imposed on
continued activity of elderly workers. We study the relevance of such a distortion in a political economy model
with endogenous age of retirement. The setting is a two-period overlapping generations model. Individuals differ
in their productivity. In the first period they work a fixed amount of time; in the second, they choose when to retire
and then receive a flat rate pension benefit. Pensions are financed by a payroll tax on earnings in the first and in
the second period of life. Such a tax is non distortionary in the first period; it is distortionary in the second period.
We allow for some rebating of the second period tax. Individuals vote on the level of the payroll tax given the
rebate which can range from 0 (biased system) to 100% (neutral system). We provide sufficient conditions for the
existence of a voting equilibrium and study its properties. Under these conditions, high tax rates are supported by
all the old and by low productivity young individuals. We show that the pivotal voter is a young individual. The
number of young individuals who have higher wage than the pivotal voter equals half the total population. We also
show that the introduction of a bias increases the political support for the pension system. Finally, we study the
simultaneous determination of the bias and the tax rate through a voting procedure and show that the equilibrium
(if any) implies a bias which is always positive and may or not be larger than one.
Keywords: social security, retirement age, majority voting
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1. Introduction
Over the last forty years, labor force participation of the elderly has been dramatically
decreasing in almost all industrialized countries. Participation rates for men aged 60 to 64
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were above 70% in the early 60s; they have fallen to 57% in Sweden and to below 20% in
Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands by the mid 90s.1 At the same time, people are
living longer and longer. In the European Union, life expectancy at age 65 has increased by
more than one year per decade since 1950. This puts an enormous pressure on the financial
viability of Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension systems and the situation will become even
more problematic when the “baby boomers” will come to retirement.
Gruber and Wise (1999) attribute this large decline in the labor force participation to the
incentives created by social security systems. Continued work at later ages may be subject
to two burdens: the traditional payroll tax which is nowhere age-dependent and forgone
benefits when social security wealth decreases with the age of retirement. This double
burden which Gruber and Wise call an implicit tax represents an allocative distortion that
induces early retirement. As they show it is higher in France, Belgium and Italy than in
Japan, Sweden or the US. Average retirement is also much earlier in these first countries
than in the second.
Why do we have such an implicit tax on continued activity? On pure efficiency grounds,
we would like to avoid any distortion in the labor retirement choice of aged workers and
let them choose the age of retirement such that the marginal utility of retiring is equal
to the worker productivity times marginal utility of consumption. This is the case in the
laissez-faire equilibrium when there is no pension system and no taxes. More generally, the
pension system could be designed to preserve this first-best trade-off and we can then think
of it as “neutral.” However, Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004) show that when the
design of the pension system reflects some redistributive concern and when non-uniform
lump-sum transfers are not available (because individual characteristics like productivity
or health status are not publicly observable) a neutral system is no longer desirable. The
optimal system is then “biased” as it implies an implicit tax on continued activity which
creates downward distortions.
In this paper we consider a setting where the optimal second-best pension system also
implies a bias. We do characterize this second-best solution as a benchmark, but our main
focus is positive rather than normative. We study the implications of a bias on the political
support for pension systems. Specifically, we characterize the equilibrium (majority voting)
size of the pension system for a given bias in the benefit formula. Finally, we also study the
endogenous determination of the bias through a specific voting procedure.
To shed light on these questions, we consider a model where each individual lives two
periods. He works one unit of time in the first, pays a proportional tax to the pension system
and saves. In the second period he works for some time and then retires. His consumption
then is financed by disposable earnings, gross returns of savings and a flat pension benefit.
Individuals differ according to age, they are young or old, and according to productivity.
In the second period, only a fraction of the payroll tax is levied on elderly workers, the
remaining being implicitly rebated. Given such a fraction which implies a distortion, a bias,
on the retirement decision, young and old vote on their preferred payroll tax rate.
We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a voting equilibrium and study its
properties. Under these conditions, high tax rates are supported by all the old and by low
productivity young individuals. We show that the pivotal voter is a young individual: the
number of young individuals who have a higher wage than the pivotal voter equals half the
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total population. It also appears that the critical level of productivity below which the young
favor a strictly positive payroll tax increases when a bias is introduced. Consequently, the
introduction of a bias increases the political support for the pension system. Finally, we
study the simultaneous determination of the bias and the tax rate through a voting procedure
and show that the equilibrium (if any) implies a bias which is always positive and may or
not be larger than one.
Before turning to these positive considerations, we briefly discuss the second-best solution
where (linear) taxes and the bias are chosen to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function
(Section 4). We show that the optimal system is also biased, but that the bias should be less
than 100%, at least under some plausible conditions. Intuitively, the optimal implicit tax
in the second period is determined very much like Sheshinski’s optimal linear income
tax; i.e. by balancing redistributive benefits against distortions. Redistributive benefits arise
because the implicit tax is proportional to income while the pension is flat. The distortion is
related to the decrease in retirement age. Like in Sheshinski’s setting the optimal (implicit)
tax is positive which implies that a full rebate of the second period tax is not called for.
Put differently, there is a bias. However, under realistic assumptions on the range of wage
inequalities, the distortion on retirement age leads to a lower tax in the second period than
in the first one. Consequently, the optimal bias can be expected to be less then 100%.
The effect of the introduction of a pension system on the retirement decision has been
studied by Sheshinski (1978) and Crawford and Lilien (1981). These authors argue that
when there are no borrowing constraints an “actuarially fair” pension system (benefits
equal contributions) does not affect the retirement decision. This is because private savings
are simply replaced by public pensions. The introduction of a pension system which is not
marginally fair leads to a decrease in the price of leisure with respect to consumption.2 If
the substitution effect dominates the income effect, it induces people to retire earlier.3
To our knowledge, only two papers deal with the retirement decision in a political econ-
omy environment. Lacomba and Lagos (1999) study the problem of a direct vote on the
(mandatory) retirement age. More closely related to our study, Conde Ruiz and Galasso
(2003, 2004) develop a model in which the vote takes place simultaneously on the payroll
tax rate and on the decision on whether to introduce an early retirement provision. They
show that the early retirement provision may be sustained at equilibrium by a coalition
of the poor workers, who want to retire early, and old people with incomplete earnings
history, who would receive no pension without this provision. This analysis and ours can
be considered as complementary. Indeed, we do not investigate the issue of introducing an
early retirement age.
2. The Model
Individuals live for two periods and they are differentiated according to their wage level
per unit of time (productivity). The distribution of productivities has support [w−, w+],
density function f (·), and cumulative distribution function F(·). We assume that the median
productivity, wm , is lower than the mean, w¯. The intertemporal utility function is:
U (c, d) = u(c) + βu(d),
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where c is the first period consumption and d is the second period consumption; β is a
factor of time preference, which is, by assumption, equal to 1/(1+r ) where r is the interest
rate. The utility function u(·) is increasing and concave: u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0. Moreover,
we assume that limc→0 u′(c) = +∞ and that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is
not greater than 1: Rr (c) = −cu′′(c)/u′(c) ≤ 1. Second period consumption, d, is to be
distinguished from overall spending in the second period, x . Overall spending includes
consumption plus the monetary disutility of z ∈ [0, 1], which is the fraction of the period
the individual continues to work. This variable is interpreted as the retirement age. We
assume a quadratic specification for the disutility of work, so that d = x − γ z2/2. The
parameter γ specifies the intensity of this disutility.
First and second periods are of equal length, normalized to 1. Labor supply is assumed
to be inelastic in the first period. In the second period, individuals decide which fraction
of time, z, they spend working.4 Observe that with our specific form of the labor disutility
function, there are no income effects in labor supply decisions which thus depends only on
the relative price of leisure and consumption.
First and second period consumption for an individual with productivity w are respec-
tively given by:
c = w(1 − τ ) − s
x = s(1 + r ) + wz(1 − θτ ) + P,
where τ ∈ [0, 1] is the payroll tax rate5 and s ≥ 0 is the amount of savings; P corresponds
to the total pension received and, by assumption, does not depend on z. The parameter
θ ∈ [0, 1] measures the bias of the pension system. We define a neutral system as a system
that does not distort individual decisions concerning retirement age. In other words, it does
not modify the relative price of leisure and consumption, compared to the situation with
no pension scheme. In a neutral system, the marginal benefit of working one more year
is then w. This is the case in our setting when θ = 0. When θ > 0, the relative price of
leisure and consumption becomes w(1 − θτ ). Consumption is therefore more expensive
and individuals are induced to retire earlier.6
Note that P does not depend on w; the pension system is Beveridgean. Everyone con-
tributes for an amount proportional to his labor income but the benefit received does not
vary across individuals. This means that the pension system considered operates income
redistribution across individuals of the same generation.7
3. Individual Saving and Retirement Decisions
In this section, we characterize the savings and retirement decisions of old and young indi-
viduals, for given τ , Pand θ . We denote (zy, sy) the optimal decisions of young individuals,
where zy is the retirement age and sy is the amount of savings. Decisions concerning savings
have been made in the past for old people. Their only decision is to choose when to retire.
The optimal retirement decision of an old individual is denoted zo.
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3.1. The Old
The program of old individuals is the following:
max
z





0 ≤ z ≤ 1.
The first-order condition for an interior value of z is:
w(1 − θτ ) − γ zo = 0.
This leads to
zo = w(1 − θτ )
γ
. (2)
In order to ensure that zo ≤ 1 for everyone, we assume γ ≥ w+. All the individuals choose
to work in the second period (except when θτ = 1). The higher the productivity of an
individual, the later he retires: consumption being cheaper for more productive individuals,
they choose to work and consume more, provided of course that there is no income effect.
On the other hand, increasing the bias of the system or the payroll tax rate increases the price
of consumption with respect to leisure and consequently induces people to retire earlier.
When θτ = 0, there are no distortions so that zo is equal to w/γ which corresponds to the
first best level. Finally, a higher disutility of work yields lower retirement ages.
3.2. The Young
The program of young individuals is the following:
max
z,s
u[w(1 − τ ) − s] + βu[s(1 + r ) + wz(1 − θτ ) + P − γ z2/2] (3)
subject to
0 ≤ z ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ s ≤ w(1 − τ ).
The young anticipate that they will choose their retirement age according to (2). Conse-
quently, we have
d = s(1 + r ) + w
2(1 − θτ )2
2γ
+ P.
Recalling that by assumption β (1 + r ) = 1, the first order condition for an interior solution
of s is:
−u′(c) + u′(d) = 0.
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Individuals equalize first and second period consumptions (net of the disutility of labor).
For individuals choosing an interior solution, we obtain:
sy =
w(1 − τ ) − w2(1−θτ )22γ − P
(2 + r ) . (4)
3.3. Budget Constraint




P f (w) dw = N yτ
∫ w+
w−
w f (w) dw + N oθτ
∫ w+
w−
wz f (w) dw
⇔ P = (1 + n)τw¯ + θτ y¯ (5)
= (1 + n)τw¯ + θτ (1 − θτ )
γ
E(w2),
where N y and N o are respectively the numbers of young and old individuals, n is the rate
of population growth, y = wz, y¯ = ∫ w+
w−
y f (w) dw and E(w2) = ∫ w+
w−
w2 f (w) dw. We
assume that
1 + n





E(w2) > w¯, condition (6) requires that n is not too large compared to r . It is
always satisfied when n ≤ r .
The total pension received by a given individual is the sum of (per capita) tax revenues on
first and second period incomes. The tax base in the first period, (1 + n)w¯, is fixed whereas
it depends on θτ in the second period. Put differently, taxation only gives rise to distortions
on second period income. Differentiating (6) yields:





P ′′(τ ) = −2θ
2
γ
E(w2) ≤ 0. (8)
The budget curve, represented on Figure 1, is concave, always above the line τ (1 + n)w¯
and P is equal to τ (1 + n)w¯ when θτ = 0 or 1.
4. Optimal Solution: First- and Second-Best
Even though our approach is mainly positive, it is worth looking at the solution chosen by
a utilitarian social planner. For simplicity the formal analysis in this section concentrates
on the case where r = n. However, we shall also sketch the case where r and n differ. The
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Figure 1. The budget curve.
results do not change when n > r . On the other hand, when r > n some of the results change
but the main conclusion is not affected. We successively consider the first-best allocation
and then the second-best solution achieved with the instruments (and information) available
in our setting. These solutions provide interesting benchmarks for the interpretation of the
voting equilibria considered below. In particular they allow one to study the rationale (if
any) of a distorting tax (biased system) from a normative optimal taxation perspective.










1 + n −
w
1 + n (1 + n + z(w))
]
f (w) dw = 0. (9)
The first order conditions imply:




where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint. These conditions
are rather standard and intuitive. Consumption is equalized across individuals and even
across periods if β(1 + n) = 1.8 Labor supply varies across individuals such that the
marginal utility of retirement γz is equal to the marginal productivity of labor, w. 9 This
first-best solution can be decentralized with lump-sum taxes and transfers and naturally with
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θ = 0 (τ would then be non-distortionary). It is plain that this solution cannot be achieved
with the instruments considered in our setting.
We now consider the second-best problem. To make this a meaningful benchmark, poli-
cies are restricted in the same way as in the voting process considered below.10 Instruments
are thus limited to the parameters τ , θ and P . Without loss of generality we will introduce
a new variable τ˜ ≡ θτ so that the social planner acts as if he determines a tax rate for the
first period τ and another one, τ˜ , for the second period.





u(w(1 − τ ) − sy)
+ βu
(





with respect to τ and τ˜ , subject to
P = (1 + n)τ w¯ + τ˜
∫ w+
w−
w z(w) f (w) dw. (11)
where sy and zy are respectively defined by (4) and (2). Substituting for (2) and (11), the
utility in the second period is:
u
(
sy(1 + r ) + w
2(1 − τ˜ )2
2γ




















w2(1 − τ˜ )
γ





To interpret (12), assume first that there is no liquidity constraint (savings can be negative).
Then, c (w) = d (w) for all w and we have τ = 1. When there is a liquidity constraint,
on the other hand, τ has to be less than 1 to ensure a positive consumption in the first
period. However, we continue to have a positive tax. Recall that the tax on the first period
income does not affect labor supply. The standard linear income tax problem then calls
for a one hundred percent tax which is redistributed in a lump sum way. However, here
the redistribution takes place in the second period (through the flat pension). When there
is no liquidity constraint this is of no relevance and the traditional result goes through.
With a liquidity constraint, a 100% tax is of course not desirable. In addition, a high tax
then adversely affects individuals with a low w: they have to pay taxes on an already low
first-period income while the lump sum refund (pension) only occurs in the second period.
Note that when r > n, the tax rate may be less than one, even without a liquidity constraint.
This is because the redistributive benefits of the tax (and the lump sum transfer it finances)
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has to be balanced against the inefficiency of the pay-as-you go system (which has then a
lower return than private savings).




u′(d)[w2 − E(w2)] f (w) dw∫ w+
w−
u′(d)[w2 − 2 E(w2)] f (w) dw
where the numerator is the covariance between the marginal utility of d(w) and the square
of the productivity levels. This covariance is negative. We thus have:
τ˜ = cov (u
′(d), w2)
cov (u′(d), w2) − E(w2) ∫ w+
w−
u′(d) f (w) dw, (13)
namely 0 < τ˜ < 1. Observe that if τ˜ were levied on w rather than on wz, in other words
if there was no distortion, τ˜ would be equal to 1. This is useful for what follows. Further,
observe that the design of the second period tax (and thus of the bias) is not directly affected
by the relationship between r and n. With a utilitarian objective, it is the liquidity constraint
for τ and the labor disincentive for τ˜ which prevent the tax rates to be maximal. These two
factors are also crucial in our political economy model.
To sum up, and recalling the definition τ˜ = θτ we have shown that the (utilitarian)
second-best policy always calls for a positive bias. In the case where there is no liquidity
constraint, we can also be sure that θ < 1. Consequently, it is then always optimal to have
some rebating of the second period tax.11 When there is a liquidity constraint, on the other
hand, the comparison between τ and τ˜ is in principle ambiguous and the bias can be smaller
as well as larger than one. However, for reasonable assumptions on the wage distribution
and labor supply elasticities τ < τ˜ (i.e., θ > 1) will not arise. Intuitively, τ < τ˜ could arise
if the redistributive benefits of the second period tax (relative to the first period tax) were to
outweigh the distortion. This requires a highly unequal wage distribution; recall that (with
a liquidity constraint) the individuals with the lowest wage tend to be penalized by a high
first-period tax.
5. Majority Voting Equilibrium Tax Rate
We now turn to the study of the voting equilibrium. For the time being we assume that the
bias, θ , is exogenously given so that the policy choice involves a single dimension, namely
τ (with P then being automatically determined by the budget constraint (6)).
5.1. Preferred Tax Rates
Define
V y(τ, θ ; w) = u[w(1 − τ ) − sy] + βu[sy(1 + r ) + P(τ, θ ) + w2(1 − θτ )2/2γ ]
(14)
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and
V o(τ, θ ; w) = u[so(1 + r ) + P(τ, θ ) + w2(1 − θτ )2/2γ ], (15)
which represent the utility levels attained by type w individuals, young or old, for given τ
and θ . Preferred tax rates for young and old individuals, denoted respectively τ y and τ o,
are obtained by solving the following programs:
max
τ∈[0,1]
V i (τ, θ ; w), i = y, o.
The following proposition states the properties of the most preferred tax rates.
Proposition 1.
(i) Preferred tax rates of young individuals are non-increasing with productivity.
(ii) No young individual chooses a corner solution at τ = 1. The preferred tax rate of
young individuals with productivity w ≤ w˜ is positive, with w˜ = w¯(1 + n)/(1 + r )
when θ = 0 while w˜ > w¯(1+n)/(1+r ) when θ > 0. Consequently, the introduction
of a bias increases the political support for the pension system.
(iii) Old individuals choose corner solutions with either τ o = 1 for everyone or alterna-
tively τ o = 1 for the poor old and τ o = 0 for the rich old.
The formal proof is given in Appendix 1. Here we provide a sketch of the main intuitions.
The intuition for the first result is as follows. Consider for simplicity the case θ = 0. An
increase of w has three effects. First, when w increases, first period income also increases.
Consequently, the individual also wants a higher second period consumption (which is a
normal good) and thus a higher (first-period) tax.
Second, the relative price of first and second periods consumptions decreases. This is
because with a PAYG system this relative price is given by w¯(1 + n)/w. Put differently, it
costs less (in terms of first period consumption) to buy one unit of second period consumption
for a low productivity individual than for a high one. By this substitution effect, high
productivity individuals are induced to buy less second period consumption. For utility
functions such that Rr (·) < 1, this substitution effect dominates the first effect and low
productivity individuals want tax rates larger than high productivity individuals. Note that
when Rr (·) = 1 (logarithmic utility function), income and substitution effects neutralize
each other and preferred tax rates are constant with respect to productivity.
These two effects has already been pointed out in the related literature such as Casamatta,
Cremer and Pestieau (2000) or Tabellini (2000); see Galasso and Profeta (2002) for a survey.
The novelty here is a third effect arising from individuals also working in the second period.
Because second period income increases with productivity, high productivity individuals
raise their first period consumption (which is a normal good) by reducing the payroll tax rate.
This effect reinforces the second one. As a consequence, preferred tax rates are decreasing
with productivity even when Rr (·) = 1.
The first part of point (ii) is obvious. When the tax rate equals one, marginal utility of
consumption tends to infinity and all individuals prefer a smaller tax rate. To illustrate the
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second part, let us write the first-order derivative of a young individual life cycle utility at





= −wu′(c) + β(1 + n)w¯u′(d) + β θ
γ
(E(w2) − w2)u′(d)
= (−w + β(1 + n)w¯ + β θ
γ
(E(w2) − w2))u′(d),
where we have used the fact that saving is positive when τ = 0 which implies that u′(c) =
u′(d). A first observation is that, in a neutral system (θ = 0), individuals choose a positive tax
rate if and only if w ≤ βw¯(1+n) = w¯(1+n)/(1+r ). This is because with θ = 0 there is no
taxation of second period income. Individuals favoring a positive tax rate are those for whom
the rate of return of the PAYG system, (1+n)w¯/w is higher than the rate of return of private
savings, 1 + r . This is a standard result in the literature. Now, if one introduces a bias in the
system which is a new feature of our analysis, second period incomes are redistributed from
individuals with a productivity level higher than
√
E(w2) towards individuals with a lower
productivity.12 Therefore, individuals such that w ≤ w¯(1 + n)/(1 + r ) continue to favor
a positive tax rate but some individuals with a higher productivity also do. Consequently,
it appears that the introduction of a bias increases the political support for the pension
system.
The last point of the proposition says that old individuals choose corner solutions for
the tax rates. To understand this, differentiate the objective function of the old (15), with





(1 + n)w¯ + θ (1 − 2θτ )
γ





When θ = 0, the RHS of (16) is necessarily positive. In a neutral system (and by
continuity in a slightly biased system), the welfare of an old individual is an increas-
ing function of the tax rate. Consequently, every old individual wants the tax rate to
be as high as possible and choose τ = 1. This is the usual case encountered in the
literature.
When θ is increased, one can see, by evaluating the above expression at τ = 0, that old
people with productivity w2 < E(w2) + (1 + n)w¯γ /θ want a positive tax rate. We prove
in the appendix that they in fact most prefer τ = 1. On the other hand, old individuals with
a higher productivity dislike a marginal increase in the tax rate (starting from τ = 0). This
does not mean that their optimal tax rate is 0. Instead, we show that their objective function
may be convex. To see this, note that (16) is positive at τ = 1 when θ = 1. When θ = 1
and τ approaches 1, everyone stops working and the old rich do not suffer anymore from
the redistribution towards the poor. On the other hand, their pension increases with the tax
rate. They thus favor a marginal increase in the tax rate.
To sum up, old people with productivity w2 < E(w2) + (1 + n)w¯γ /θ favor the maximal
tax rate τ = 1. Those with a higher productivity may prefer 0 or 1 but no one has an interior
optimal tax rate (between 0 and 1). The productivity level above which the optimal tax rate
becomes 1 is derived in the appendix.
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5.2. Voting Equilibrium
We turn to the determination of the equilibrium payroll tax rate under majority voting. We
have proved in Appendix 1 that, for utility functions such that Rr (·) ≤ 1, preferences of the
young over tax rates satisfy the single-crossing condition established by Gans and Smart
(1996). This means that we can order young individuals and alternatives such that when an
individual prefers the higher of two alternatives, all the individuals with a lower productivity
display the same preference. Similarly, one can show that preferences of the old also satisfy
this single-crossing property. However, these properties are not sufficient to guarantee the
existence of a Condorcet winner. A sufficient condition for that would be that the single
crossing property holds when the entire population (young and old jointly) is considered.
However, single crossing within each subgroup does not imply single crossing for the entire
population. To ensure existence of a voting equilibrium we thus need additional assumptions.
Specifically, we restrict our attention to cases where the utility of the old is monotonically
increasing with the tax rate. This is true when the marginal utility of the richest old individual
is positive at τ = 0 which, from (16), is the case when θ/γ ≤ (1+n)w¯/(w2+ − E(w2)). This
condition is satisfied when the bias parameter, θ , is small enough, or when γ is large enough.
With the old preferring a maximum tax rate and the preferred tax of the young decreasing
with productivity (Proposition 1, (i)) the construction of the equilibrium is straightforward.
Specifically, and recalling that n > 0, the pivotal voter is a young individual so that the
number of young individuals who have a higher wage (and thus want a lower tax than
the pivotal voter) equals half the total population. This is stated formally in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. If θ/γ ≤ (1 + n)w¯/(w2+ − E(w2)), a voting equilibrium on τ exists. It is
given by τmv(θ ) = τ y(θ ; wpiv), where wpiv is the productivity of the pivotal individual which
is implicitly determined by the following condition:
N y(1 − F(wpiv)) = N
o + N y
2
⇔ F(wpiv) = n2(1 + n) . (17)
Observe that condition (17) also implies that N o + N y F(wpiv) = (N o + N y)/2 so that the
young with a lower wage plus the old (i.e., the individuals who want a higher tax) represent
also half of the population.
Using Proposition 1 (ii) we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The tax rate τmv defined by Proposition 2 is positive if
wpiv < w¯(1 + n)/(1 + r ). (18)
Interestingly, condition (18) is necessarily satisfied when n = r . To see this observe that
n/(2(1 + n)) < 1/2. Consequently, the pivotal voter has a productivity level below the
median level wm which in turn is below the mean level w¯. This argument also makes it
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clear that condition (18) continues to hold when n is smaller than r , but not by “too much”.
However, as the differential between n and r increases the condition becomes more and more
difficult to satisfy. Intuitively, the pivotal individual benefits from the redistribution implied
by the PAYG system and thus favors a positive tax as long as the return of PAYG, namely n,
is sufficiently close to the interest rate. The results in Propositions 2 and 3 have a familiar
flavor. Similar properties are obtained for example in Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau
(2000) and Tabellini (2000). Note however that in this earlier work condition (18) is both
necessary and sufficient whereas it is only sufficient here. As emphasized earlier, people
with a productivity level above w¯(1+n)/(1+r ) may sustain the PAYG system when θ > 0.
In other words, the political support for the PAYG system is increased when it is biased.
To conclude, it is important to stress that the condition for existence imposed in Propo-
sition 2 is only a sufficient condition. A less stringent (though more complex) condition
would be to require that the utility of the richest old be higher at the point τ y(θ ; wpiv) than
at τ = 0, that is:
V o[τ y(θ ; wpiv), θ ; w+] ≥ V o[0, θ ; w+]. (19)
If this condition is satisfied for the richest old, it holds effectively for the entire old generation.
Any tax rate lower than τ y(θ ; wpiv) is thus rejected by the coalition of all the old and the
young to the left of wpiv. A tax rate higher than τ y(θ ; wpiv), on the other hand, is (by
definition) rejected by the young to the right of wpiv. Consequently, as long as condition
(19) holds, τ y(θ ; wpiv) continues to be a Condorcet winner even when the preferences of
the old are not monotonically increasing.
6. Endogenous Bias
In the previous section, we have assumed that θ was exogenously given. We now turn to the
political determination of θ . The natural approach would be to have the pair (θ, τ ) chosen
jointly in a majority vote. However, it is well known that a Condorcet winner is unlikely
to exist when the issue space is multidimensional and this model is not an exception. To
overcome this difficulty we consider a more restricted voting procedure, introduced by
Shepsle (1979), and assume that the parameters θ and τ are chosen simultaneously and
independently. The equilibrium (if any) of this procedure is then a pair (θ S, τ S) such that
the level of each variable is a Condorcet winner given the level of the other variable. In
other words, it is given by the intersection of the two “reaction functions” τmv(θ ) and θmv(τ )
specifying the majority equilibrium level of a variable given the level of the other variable.
The equilibrium tax for a given bias has been studied in Section 5.2 where τmv(θ) is defined
in Proposition 2. We now turn to the determination of θmv(τ ), the equilibrium bias for a
given tax rate.
6.1. Voting Equilibrium Level of θ for a Given Level of τ
With τ given, the variable left to be determined is θ, P being determined by the budget
constraint. Differentiating (1) and (3) shows that the slope of an indifference curve in the
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2(1 − θτ )
γ
> 0,
for the young as well as for the old individuals. This expression is increasing with w.
Consequently, preferences are single-crossing so that a majority voting equilibrium on θ
exists.
An individual’s most preferred level of θ is obtained by solving:
max
θ∈[0,1/τ ]
V i (τ, θ ; w), i = y, o,
This yields
θ i = E(w
2) − w2






[τ (2E(w2) − w2)]2 < 0, i = y, o,
so that the most preferred level of θ decreases with productivity. Notice that these ex-
pressions apply for old as well as for young individuals. Consequently, individual’s most
preferred levels of θ do not depend on age. A young and an old individual with the same
w prefer the same θ . Putting these elements together, it follows that the Condorcet winner
is then the level of θ most preferred by the individuals with median productivity and we
have:





) > 0. (20)
This hyperbolic expression is represented on Figure 2 for τ ∈ [0, 1]. It thus appears that
the equilibrium bias is positive and decreasing in the tax rate.
Intuitively, (20) defines the second period tax rate τ˜ = θτ , which is optimal from the
median voter’s perspective. This rate is given by




The crucial property of this expression is that the level of this second period tax does not
depend on the first period tax, τ .13 In other words, when τ changes, the median voter’s most
preferred level of τ˜ remains constant and is achieved simply by adjusting θ .
6.2. Simultaneous Voting
Returning to the original problem, namely the determination of the equilibrium pair (θ S, τ S),
we face the difficulty that τmv(θ ), may not be defined for all levels of θ ; see Section 5. The
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Figure 2. Determination of the simultaneous voting equilibrium.
simplest way to address this problem is to consider a candidate equilibrium (θ c, τ c), given
by the intersection of θmv(τ ) with the curve τ y(θ ; wpiv), which gives the preferred tax of
a young individual with productivity wpiv (defined by (17)). Put differently, the candidate
equilibrium, (θ c, τ c), is defined by the conditions θ c = θmv(τ c), τ c = τ y(θ c; wpiv); see
Figure 2 for an illustration. We show in Appendix B that θmv(τ ) and τ y(θ ; wpiv) intersect
at least once so that the candidate equilibrium (θ c, τ c) exists. This does not imply that a
simultaneous, issue by issue, voting equilibrium, (θ S, τ S), exists. However, (θ c, τ c) is an
equilibrium when (sufficient) condition (19) is satisfied, that is when
w2+[1 − (1 − θ cτ c)2]
2γ
≤ (1 + n)τ cw¯ + θ








For simplicity we assume in the remainder of this section that this is effectively the case.
Then it is plain that this procedure yields a positive bias θ S > 0 and an interior solution for
the tax rate 0 < τ S < 1. We also have an interior solution for the second period tax τ˜ = θ Sτ S .
However, there is no obvious way to determine whether the bias is larger or smaller than one;
inspection of expressions only allows one to conclude that both cases appear to be possible.
Similarly, the comparison between the second period tax implied by (21) and the socially
optimal level defined by (13) appears to be ambiguous. Not surprisingly, it is then also not
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Table 1. Numercial illustrations: Simultaneous voting (Shepsle) equilibrium and
utilitarian optimum.
Shepsle Util. Opt.
θ τ θτ θ τ θτ
Skewed dist.
ε = 0.2 0.44 0.82 0.36 0.25 0.30 0.08
ε = 0.5 0.80 0.45 0.36 0.56 0.29 0.16
ε = 1 1.17 0.31 0.36 0.96 0.26 0.25
Unif. dist.
ε = 0.2 0.22 0.89 0.19 0.17 0.28 0.05
ε = 0.5 0.40 0.49 0.19 0.42 0.26 0.11
ε = 1 0.64 0.31 0.19 0.97 0.21 0.21
possible to compare the equilibrium bias θ S to the optimal (second-best) bias studied in
Section 4. To illustrate the results and to show that the comparisons between equilibrium
and optimum are effectively ambiguous we now present some numerical examples.
6.3. Numerical Examples
Consider the following specifications for the various components of our model. Produc-
tivities are distributed on [1, 100] and we set γ = 100 and r = n = 1. We consider two
possible distributions: a distribution skewed to the right with wm = 17.59 < w¯ = 22.33 <√
E(w2) = 26.82 and a uniform distribution function with wm = w¯ = 50.5 <
√
E(w2) =
58.03. The utility function is isoelastic: u(x) = x1−ε/(1 − ε), where ε is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion. We consider three levels of ε: 0.2, 0.5 and 1.
Table 1 presents the simultaneous voting equilibrium (θ S, τ S) and the utilitarian (second-
best) optimum (θ∗, τ ∗) for each combination of parameter values. To facilitate interpretation,
we also report θτ = τ˜ , i.e., the second period implicit tax rate.
These results are very interesting and confirm a number of points suggested by the
analytical expressions. In particular, they show that a bias which is larger than one can
effectively arise at the voting equilibrium. Furthermore, we find cases where the equilibrium
bias exceeds the optimal one, and cases where the opposite is true. Similarly, for the second
period tax, θ Sτ S > θ∗τ ∗ as well as θ Sτ S < θ∗τ ∗ can effectively occur.
7. Conclusion
This paper has examined two related questions. First, we have studied the determination
of the size of the pension system through the political process when retirement age is
endogenous. Specifically, each individual chooses his retirement age by taking into account
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the (given) benefit formula which may or may not be biased (i.e., impose an implicit tax
on continued activity of the elderly). We have shown how the endogenous retirement age
decision affects voters preferences over tax rates and how this relationship is affected by
the benefit formula. Overall, it has turned out that the general properties of the voting
equilibrium (if any) are not qualitatively different from the case with exogenous retirement
age, see Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2000).14 In particular, the feature that high tax
rates are supported by all the old and by low productivity young individuals has reemerged
within our current setting.
The second question has involved a more significant departure from the existing literature.
It concerns the determination of the benefit formula and, more specifically, the bias of
the pension system. The challenge we were addressing was to seek explanations for the
empirically observed bias in retirement systems. This is a more ambitious problem and we
can only claim to have provided some preliminary and partial solutions. We have shown
that a biased system is optimal from a utilitarian perspective and that it also tends to emerge
from a specific political process (simultaneous and independent vote). From that perspective,
political economy considerations are not necessary to explain the emergence of a biased
system. On the other hand, an extreme bias (θ > 1) though often observed in reality is not
consistent with welfare maximization.15 It can, however, emerge from the political process.
Specifically, we have shown that a very simple majority procedure is sufficient to obtain
such a drastic departure from optimality.
Our setting is rather restrictive and our findings have to be qualified accordingly. Our
main endeavor it to point to possible explanations for the high implicit tax on contin-
ued activity. We do not claim that the effects we discuss are always relevant, nor that
they provide the unique or even main driving forces. To address these issues additional
studies featuring (for instance) more general benefit formulas and alternative specifica-
tions of the political process are required. We leave these questions open for future
research.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
(i) To prove that individually optimal tax rates of the young are decreasing with produc-
tivity, we show that the slope of indifference curves in the (τ, P) plane is increasing
with productivity, that is d2 P/dτdw > 0.
The equation of an indifference curve is derived by solving:
u[w(1 − τ ) − sy] + βu[sy(1 + r ) + P + w2(1 − θτ )2/2γ ] = c,





wu′(c) + β w2
γ
θ (1 − θτ )u′(d)
βu′(d) > 0. (22)
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w + β w2
γ
θ (1 − θτ )
β
≥ 0.
Indifference curves are increasing. Moreover, d2 P/dτdw > 0: the slope of indiffer-
ence curves is increasing with productivity.





(u′(c) + w(1 − τ )u′′(c))βu′(d) − βwu′(c)w
γ




θ(1 − θτ )
=




θ(1 − θτ ).
If Rr (·) ≤ 1, d2 P/dτdw is positive. It follows that the slope of indifference curves is
increasing with productivity. This leads to our conclusion that preferred tax rates are
decreasing with productivity.
(ii) To prove that no young individual chooses a corner solution at τ = 1 and that the
preferred tax rate of the young with productivity w < w¯(1 + n)/(1 + r ) is positive,
we evaluate the impact of a marginal increase in τ on the utility of the young, namely
dV y/dτ , respectively at τ = 1 and at τ = 0.
Differentiating (14) with respect to τ and using (7), we have
dV y
dτ
= −wu′(c) + β
(
P ′(τ ) − w




= −wu′(c) + β
(













= −wu′(0) + β
(









(1 + n)w¯ + E(w




It is clear that, if limx→0 u′(x) = +∞, dV y/dτ |τ=1 < 0.





= −wu′(c) + β
(
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We argue now that sy > 0 when τ = 0. From (4),
sy |τ=0 =
w − w22γ − P(0)
(2 + r ) =
w − w22γ
(2 + r ) > 0 ⇔ w < 2γ.








− w + β
(







⇔ −w + β
(







⇔ −w + 1 + n











If w < w¯(1 + n)/(1 + r ) then, by assumption, w <
√
E(w2) and condition (23)
is satisfied. When θ = 0, only people with productivity w < w¯(1 + n)/(1 + r )
want a positive tax rate. When θ > 0, this is also the case for some individuals with
higher productivity. This follows from continuity because inequality (23) is strict for
w = w¯(1 + n)/(1 + r ).
(iii) To prove that old individuals choose only corner solutions, we compare the slope of
their indifference curves with the slope of the government budget constraint.
Indifference curves for old individuals are derived by solving
u
(
s(1 + r ) + P + w


















Comparing with (8), we find that the slope of indifference curves decreases more
quickly than the slope of the budget curve if and only if w2 > 2E(w2). At τ = 0, the
productivity level such that the slope of the indifference curve equals the slope of the
budget curve is given by:
w2
γ











w2 f (w) dw < w+
∫ w+
w−
w f (w) dw = w+w¯
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and recalling that γ ≥ w+,
w2s > 2E(w2).
Following the discussion above, this indifference curve is always below the budget
curve. Therefore, individuals with productivity ws have a preferred tax rate equal
to 1. Observing that the slope of indifference curves is increasing with productiv-
ity, all individuals with a productivity less than ws want also a tax rate equal to 1.
Individuals with a higher productivity do not choose an interior solution for τ . In-
deed, their indifference curves being “more concave” than the budget curve, a point
of tangency between an indifference curve and the budget curve corresponds to a
minimizing tax rate. The individuals indifferent between τ = 0 and τ = 1 are such
that
V o(0; wo) = V o(1; wo) ⇔ u
(






s(1 + r ) + P(1) + w







= (1 + n)w¯ + θ (1 − θ )
γ
E(w2) + w
o2 (1 − θ )2
2γ
⇔ wo2 = 2γ (1 + n)w¯
θ (2 − θ ) + 2
1 − θ
2 − θ E(w
2), if θ 
= 0.
Note that this equation does not always have a solution. In particular, when θ = 0,
every old individual most prefer a tax rate equal to 1. Observe also that the indifferent
old individual has a productivity level higher than w¯. Finally, dwo2/dθ < 0.
Appendix B: Proof That the Curves τ y(θ; wpiv) and θmv (τ ) Intersect at Least Once
We already know that when θ = 0, θmv (τ ) is above τmv (θ ). We now proceed to show that
the converse also occurs for some value of θ. This, along with the continuity of the curves
proves the claim.
To find a point where θmv (τ ) is below τmv(θ ) (and only as part of our strategy in the
proof) we characterize the sequential (τ followed by θ ) voting equilibrium (θ sv, τ sv) and
use the property that by definition θ sv = θmv(τ sv), i.e., (θ sv, τ sv) is on the curve θ = θmv(τ )
[because θ is determined in the second stage and is thus a majority equilibrium given τ ].
Let define (θ sv, τ sv) as the solution of
max
τ
u[wpiv(1 − τ ) − sy] + βu
[
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Substituting the constraint in the objective function, we obtain the following FOC on τ :
wpivu
′(c) = β(1 + n)w¯u′(d).
Note that for τ sv to be positive, condition (18) must be satisfied.
Using this condition, we obtain
∂V y
∂τ
(τ sv, θ sv; wpiv) = βθ
γ
[(1 − 2θ svτ sv)E(w2) − (1 − θ svτ sv)w2piv]u′(d)
> 0 ⇔ w2piv <
1 − 2θ svτ sv
1 − θ svτ sv E(w
2).
Observing that θ svτ sv = w2m/E(w2), this condition becomes wpiv < wm , which is always
true. We can conclude that at the point (θ sv, τ sv) which is on the curve θmv(τ ), wpiv wants
to increase the tax rate. Therefore, τ y(θ, wpiv) is above θmv(τ ) at that point.
Notes
1. A notable exception is Japan.
2. Departure from actuarial fairness can be of three types. First, the pension system may redistribute across
individuals. Second, the aggregate level of benefits may outweigh the aggregate level of contributions, which
is typically the case in a non mature PAYG system. Third the system may not be marginally fair which is the
case when there is an implicit tax as defined above.
3. This takes an extreme form in our model where income effects are assumed away.
4. The assumption of fixed labor supply is made for the sake of simplicity. Because of this assumption, we have
to restrict our tax instruments to avoid trivial solutions. With no tax distortions, if demogrant in the first period
were available, it would call for a 100% tax on earnings in that period.
5. We implicitly assume that the tax rate chosen today remains the same in the next period: τt+1 = τt . In other
terms, the individuals believe that the decision they take today will apply for the whole future (or at least for
their retirement period). One can show that this assumption of once-and-for-all voting could be endogenized
by considering a repeated elections model in which implicit contracts among successive generations arise,
such as in Hammond (1975) or Boldrin and Rustichini (2000).
6. A pension system might also induce people to retire earlier when the amount of pension benefit foregone if
working one more year is not compensated by a corresponding increase in the pension level. This effect would
be taken into account in our model if P were decreasing in z.
7. The results would not change if a contributory element were introduced in P. In that case we would have
P = PC + PF where PC is proportional to contributions τw[1 + n + zθ ], while PF is flat i.e., independent
of w and z.
8. With our assumption that β(1 + r ) = 1 this holds when r = n.
9. When r > n, there are no pay as you go pensions in the first best and (1 + r ) replaces (1 + n) in (9) and (10).
This case can arise in our setting because r is exogenous (for instance because we have a small open economy).
In a more sophisticated model with capital accumulation and endogenous r , the first-best necessarily implies
r = n, namely the golden rule (at least as long as we restrict ourself to the steady state).
10. In other words, restrictions on the instruments are imposed to keep the voting problem tractable. The normative
analysis could be pursued in a much more general setting; see Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004).
11. In the non linear case (benefit formula and tax), this result remains valid, except for the “top” individual; see
Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004).
12. Second period income (i.e., wz) is less than the average if and only if w <
√
E(w2).
13. This property arises because z does not depend on the first period tax. This is because with a monetary
disutility, z is not subject to income effets.
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14. Except that existence may be more problematic.
15. Under plausible assumptions on wage distribution and labor supply (retirement age) elasticity.
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